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ABSTRACT
The secrecy problem in the state-dependent cognitive interference channel is considered in this paper. In our model, there
are a primary and a secondary (cognitive) transmitter-receiver pairs, in which the cognitive transmitter has the message of
the primary one as side information. In addition, the channel is affected by a channel state sequence which is estimated
partially at the cognitive transmitter and the corresponding receiver, separately. The cognitive transmitter should cooperate
with the primary one, and it wishes to keep its message secure at the primary receiver. The achievable equivocation-rate
regions for this channel are derived using two approaches: the binning scheme coding, and superposition coding. Then the
outer bounds on the capacity are derived and the results are extended to the Gaussian examples. Copyright c© 2016 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
Interference channel, in which the intended signal for
one receiver causes interference at the other receivers, is
a basic model to study the constraints on the practical
communication networks [1]. The Cognitive Interference
Channel (CIC) is one case of the interference channels
in which one of the transmitter-receiver pair, namely the
primary one, has the privileges to use the channel [2, 3].
The secondary transmitter-receiver pair, i. e., the cognitive
one, uses the channel without causing problem for the
primary one. In one approach, the cognitive transmitter
cooperates with the primary party by spending the
cognition cost [4]. Although the capacity of this channel
remains an open problem in general case, many works
studied the achievable rate region for this channel [5–8].
Under degradedness condition, [5] derived the capacity for
the CIC. The achievable rate of [4] is improved by [6–9].
The nature of the interference channel causes to leak the
information to unintended destinations. In the information
theory literature, secure communication between the
transmission parties was first studied in [10] by Shannon.
Afterwards, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel to
model the secrecy problem in the physical layer [11].
Furthermore, he proposed the Random Coding to keep the
sent message away from the eavesdropper. This coding
scheme is based on the fact that a receiver cannot
decode any information more than its channel capacity
with low-enough error probability. Recently, there has
been a significant interest in the secrecy of multi-users
systems [12] with a particular emphasis on the secrecy of
the CIC [2, 13, 14]. The works [2, 13, 14] derived some
equivocation-rate regions for the CIC to show the trade off
between the achievable rate and the secrecy level in this
channel.
Modeling a time-varying channel, whose instantaneous
parameters depend on a random state sequence, is
introduced and studied by Shannon in his landmark
paper [15]. Moreover, the knowledge of the random state
sequence, i. e., the Channel State Information (CSI) is
assumed to be available at the transmitter in [15]. There
are considerable research interests in studying the effect
of the CSI in various channel models (see [16] and
the references therein). Specifically, the capacity of a
discrete memoryless point to point channel with non-
causal CSI available at the Transmitter (CSIT) is derived
by Gel’fand and Pinsker [17], and it is extended to the
Gaussian channel in [18]. The CIC with CSI available
at the cognitive transmitter is studied in [3, 19] and the
equivocation-rate region on this model is derived by [20].
Moreover, some works consider the impact of partial
channel state information on the capacity and performance
of the cognitive radio [21, 22].
In this paper, we study the CIC with Partial Channel
State information (CIC-PCSI). The partial CSIs are
assumed to be known non-causally at the cognitive
transmitter and the corresponding receiver (see Figure 1).
Here, the cognitive transmitter should mitigate its
Copyright c© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1
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interference at the primary receiver. Furthermore, it wishes
to keep its message confidential with respect to the primary
receiver.
The CIC-PCSI model can be motivated by the wireless
sensor network application with different sensor types [5],
in which one sensor has a better sensing capability than
the other one. The simpler sensor provides one event to
its corresponding destination, but the more capable sensor
which can sense two events, cooperates with the simpler
sensor. Since the more capable sensor senses a vital event,
it wishes to keep its message confidential at the destination
of the simpler sensor. Moreover, the channel is affected by
a channel state sequence which is estimated at the more
capable sensor and its destination, separately [23]. These
estimated observations of the channel state sequence are
not equal to each other in general case.
We study the different effects of the CSIT and CSIR
on two coding schemes to achieve the equivocation-rate
region. For this aim, we use the Binning scheme [6,
24, 25] and the Superposition Coding [2, 3, 20] in CIC-
PCSI. In the binning scheme, the cognitive transmitter,
after rate splitting, bins its message against the code-book
of the primary one. Then, it superimposes its message
on the primary transmitter’s message and the channel
state sequence. In the superposition scheme, the cognitive
transmitter superimposes its message on the primary
transmitter’s message and the channel state sequence.
In each scheme, random coding is used to guaranty
the secrecy condition for the cognitive transmitter’s
message [11]. Then, the outer bounds on the capacity
of the CIC-PCSI are proposed. Moreover, we extend the
results of two cases, i.e., binning scheme and superposition
coding, to the Gaussian model, and it is shown that the
cognitive transmitter can choose the best coding scheme
to maximize the achievable equivocation-rate region. In
comparison of our model with the different ones in [3,
6, 24, 25], we consider secrecy constraints in the CIC.
Since we assume that the primary transmitter’s message is
fully known at the cognitive transmitter, the secrecy issue
is considered for the cognitive transmitter’s message (see
the similar model in [2]). Furthermore, in compare with
the model of [13] and [14], the CSI knowledge enhances
the cognitive transmitter to improve the equivocation-rate
region.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the
channel model and some preliminaries and the definitions
are explained. In Section 3, the main results on the
achievable equivocation-rate region using the binning
scheme are proposed. Furthermore, in this section we
derive the proper outer bounds on the capacity, and extend
the results to the Gaussian case. In Section 4, using
the superposition coding, we derive the equivocation-rate
region and an outer bound on the capacity of the channel.
Then, we extend the results to the Gaussian channel as an
example. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5. The
proofs of the theorems are relegated to the appendices.
Figure 1: The cognitive interference channel with
two partial channel states information available at the
transmitter and the receiver, with a confidential message.
2. CHANNEL MODEL AND
PRELIMINARIES
2.1. The Notation
First, we explain the notation. We use X to denote a finite
alphabet with cardinality |X |. xn = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
represents the members of Xn, in which the subscripted
and superlative letters represent the components and
the vectors, respectively. xji is used to indicate the
vector (xi, . . . , xj). For the random vectors and the
random variables, which are denoted by uppercase letters,
a similar convention is used.
2.2. Channel Model
Consider a memoryless stationary state-dependent inter-
ference channel with finite input alphabets X1 and X2,
finite output alphabets Y1 and Y2, the channel states alpha-
bets S1, S2 with distribution PS1 , PS2 and a conditional
probability distribution PY1,Y2|X1,X2,S1,S2 . As shown in
the Figure 1, the t-th transmitter, where t = 1, 2, wishes
to transmit the message Wt which is uniformly distributed
on the setWt ∈ {1, . . .Mt}. The message W1 is assumed
to be known at both transmitters, but the message W2 is
just known at the transmitter 2 (the cognitive transmitter).
Furthermore, it is assumed that the channel is dependent
on two channel states. One of these channel states, i.e., S1,
is assumed to be known non-causally at the cognitive
transmitter. The other one, i.e., S2, is assumed to be
known non-causally at the cognitive destination. Thus, the
cognitive party wishes to increase its achievable rate using
this side information.
Given the inputs and the states, i.e., the n-
sequences Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn1 , Sn2 , the conditional distribution
of the channel outputs n-sequences Y n1 , Y n2 take the
product form as follows
PY n
1
,Y n
2
|Xn
1
,Xn
2
,Sn
1
,Sn
2
(yn1 , y
n
2 |xn1 , xn2 , sn1 , sn2 ) =
n∏
i=1
PY1,Y2|X1,X2,S1,S2(y1,i, y2,i|x1,i, x2,i, s1,i, s2,i).(1)
2.3. Definitions
An (M1,M2, n, Pe)-code has two encoding-decoding
functions and an error probability. The encoding functions
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are defined as
ϕ1,n :W1 → Xn1 ,
ϕ2,n :W1 ×W2 × Sn1 → Xn2 , (2)
and the channel decoders are defined by the mappings
ψ1,n : Yn1 → Wˆ1,
ψ2,n : Yn2 × Sn2 → Wˆ2. (3)
The error probability Pe = max(Pe,1, Pe,2) is defined
as
Pe,t =
∑
w1,w2
1
M1M2
P [wˆt 6= wt|w1, w2 were sent]. (4)
Definition 1
The secrecy level of the cognitive transmitter’s message
at the primary receiver (receiver 1) is measured by
normalized equivocation-rate which is defined as
R
(n)
e2
=
1
n
H(W2|Y n1 ), (5)
which is known as the “weak secrecy condition” [12].
Definition 2
The equivocation-rate-triple (R1, R2, Re2) is an
achievable region if for any ǫn > 0 there exists
an (M1,M2, n, Pe) code such that Mi ≥ 2nRi , i = 1, 2
for which we have Pe ≤ ǫn, and
0 ≤ Re2 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
R
(n)
e2
. (6)
Definition 3
The capacity region is the closure of the set of all
achievable equivocation-rate regions.
2.4. Encoding Schemes
Now, we discuss the rate achieving encoding schemes
we will use in the CIC problem. First, consider a point-
to-point state-dependent communication system in which
the CSI is known non-causally at the transmitter. Assume
that the channel state sequence S plays the role of the
interference signal which can be considered as a code-
book with rate RS = I(Y ;S). The transmitter wishes
to transmit the message W at the rate R through the
channel. There are two coding schemes to achieve the
rate region: Superposition Coding (SPC) and Gel’fand-
Pinsker Coding (GPC); depending on the interference’s
rate RS , either one may be chosen. When RS is small,
we can improve the achievable rate using the SPC. For
higher RS , we can achieve the rate using the classical
GPC. The following lemma expresses the result using
these two coding schemes [6, Lemma 1]. This lemma is
used to derive the achievable rate regions for the CIC-PCSI
in the next sections.
Lemma 1
[6, Lemma 1] The following rate region is achievable for
a point to point communication system with non-causal
CSIT
R ≤ max
PU|S,f(.)
min{I(X;Y |S),
max{I(U,S;Y )−RS, I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)}}. (7)
Outline of the proof
For the case I(S;U, Y ) ≤ RS ≤ H(S), the binning
scheme achieves the rate given by the second term of (7).
For RS ≤ I(S;U, Y ), SPC achieves the rate region by the
first term in (7). For more details we refer to [6, Lemma
1].
3. USING THE BINNING SCHEME
In this section we derive the achievable equivocation-rate
region for the CIC-PCSI, shown in Figure 1, using the
binning scheme. Then, two outer bounds on the capacity
are proposed, and the results are extended to the Gaussian
channel as special case.
3.1. An inner bound
To derive an achievable rate region for this channel, we use
the rate splitting as follows.
R1 = R1a +R1b, (8)
R2 = R2a +R2b, (9)
for non-negative rates R1a, R1b, R2a and R2b. Transmit-
ter 1, encodes the message W1 and uses the SPC with
two code-books Xn1a and Xn1b. Transmitter 2, by access
to the message W1 and the channel state Sn1 uses the
SPC with two code-books Xn1a and Xn1b . Then, it splits
the message W2 and uses GPC against Xn1a, Xn1b, Sn1 in
two steps to create Xn2 . In the first step, transmitter 2 uses
binning against Xn1a, Xn1b , Sn1 to create Un of rate R2b. In
the second step, it uses binning against Xn1a, Xn1b and Sn1
conditioned on Un to create V n of rate R2a. Finally, it
uses Un, V n, Xn1a, X
n
1b, S
n
1 to construct X
n
2 . Based on
this encoding scheme, we have the following result on the
achievable equivocation-rate region.
Theorem 1 (Achievable equivocation-rate region)
The set of equivocation-rates (R1a, R1b, R2a, R2b, Re2)
is achievable if it satisfies
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1, U |Q), (10)
R1b ≤ I(X1b; Y1, U |X1a, Q), (11)
R2a ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2|U,Q)− I(V ;X1, S1|U,Q),(12)
R2 ≤ I(V,U ;Y2, S2|Q)− I(V,U ;X1, S1|Q), (13)
R1 +R2b ≤ I(X1, U ;Y1|Q), (14)
R1b +R2b ≤ I(X1b, U ; Y2|X1a, Q), (15)
Re2 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2, U |Q)− I(V,S1;X1, Y1, U |Q),
(16)
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for input distribution factors as
p(q)p(x1a, x1b, u, v, x1, x2, s1, s2|q)
×p(y1, y2|x1, x2, s1, s2), (17)
in which the right-hand-sides (r.h.s.) of the equations (10)–
(16) are non-negative and Q is a time-sharing random
variable.
Proof
See Appendix A.
Using the Fourier-Motzkin elimination [16], the
following explicit description of the region is derived.
Corollary 1
The set of equivocation-rates (R1, R2, Re2) is achievable
if it satisfies
R1 ≤ min{I(X1;Y1, U |Q), I(X1, U ;Y1|Q)}, (18)
R2 ≤ I(V,U ; Y2, S2|Q)− I(V,U ;X1, S1|Q), (19)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2|U,Q)− I(V ;X1, S1|U,Q)
+I(X1, U ;Y1|Q), (20)
Re2 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2, U |Q)− I(V, S1;X1, Y1, U |Q),(21)
for input distribution factors as (17).
Remark 1
Theorem 1 without secrecy aspect and by substitut-
ing S1 = S2 = ∅, is reduced to the result of [6, Theorem
1] for the CIC. Moreover, the equivocation-rate (16), by
substituting S1 = S2 = ∅, is reduced to equivocation-rate
of [13, Theorem 1]. It means that Theorem 1 includes the
results of [6] and [13].
3.1.1. The Symmetric Channel State
The special case S1 = S2 = S is of special interest.
This case resembles the secret-key agreement scenario [16,
26]. The equivocation-rate (16) in this case is reduced to
the following theorem:
Theorem 2
The secrecy-rate (SR) of the CIC, when the state
sequence sn is known at the transmitter and the receiver, is
given by
R
SR
e2
≤ I(V ;Y2|U, S)− I(V ;X1, Y1|U, S)
+H(S|U,X1, Y1). (22)
Proof
The achievability of (22) results from (16) as follows.
Re2 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S, U)− I(V, S;X1, Y1, U)
= I(V ;Y2, U |S) − I(V ;X1, Y1, U |S)
+I(V ;S)− I(S;X1, Y1, U)
= I(V ;Y2, U |S) − I(V ;X1, Y1, U |S)
+H(S|U,X1, Y1)−H(S|V )
≤ I(V ;Y2, U |S) − I(V ;X1, Y1, U |S)
+H(S|U,X1, Y1), (23)
in which the last inequality follows from the non-negativity
of the entropy function. Note that V is an optimal choice.
Therefore, selecting V = (V, S) leads to H(S|V ) = 0,
and the bound in the last inequality will be tight. An
alternative proof can be derived directly from the secret-
key agreement method taken in [26, Theorem 3].
Remark 2
The inner bound of Theorem 2 can be interpreted from
the secret-key agreement point of view [26, Theorem
3]. The term I(V ;Y2|U, S)− I(V ;X1, Y1|U, S) is the
rate of a multiplexed CIC in which the cognitive
transmitter and both the receivers (the primary and
the secondary receivers), have knowledge of sn and
the common message un, non-causally. The second
term H(S|U,X1, Y1) is the additional secret-key rate
which can be produced by using the fact that the channel
state sn is only known to the cognitive transmitter-receiver
pair. For more details on using the channel state as a shared
secret-key between the transmitter-receiver pair, see [26].
3.2. Outer bounds
The following theorems provide two outer bounds on
the capacity region of the CIC-PCSI. In the first outer
bound, we use the usual approach taken in the previous
work [6, 13] based on the Fano’s inequality. In the second
outer bound, we use the approach taken by [7], which only
depends on the conditional marginal distributions of the
channel outputs given the inputs. This outer bound does
not include auxiliary random variables and every mutual
information term involves the inputs and outputs of the
channel. Therefore, the second outer bound is looser than
the first one, but can be more easily evaluated.
Theorem 3 (Outer bound 1)
The set of rates (R1, R2, Re2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min{I(U,V1;Y1), I(V1;Y1, U)}, (24)
R2 ≤ I(U,V2;Y2|S1, S2), (25)
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
I(V2;Y2|U, V1, S1, S2)
+I(V1, U ;Y1), I(V2, U ; Y2|S1, S2)
+I(V1;Y1|U, V2)
}
, (26)
Re2 ≤ min
{
I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U),
I(V2;Y2|V1, U) − I(V2;Y1|V1, U)
}
, (27)
for input distribution that factors as
p(s1)p(s2)p(v1)p(v2)p(u|v1, v2)p(x1|v1)
p(x2|u, v1, v2, s1)p(y1, y2|x1, x2, s1, s2), (28)
is an outer bound on the capacity of this channel.
Proof
The proof of Theorem 3 is relegated to Appendix B.
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Figure 2: The Gaussian cognitive interference channel with
channel state available at the transmitter and the receiver,
with a confidential message.
Theorem 4 (Outer bound 2)
The set of rates (R1, R2, Re2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y1), (29)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y2|X1, S1, S2), (30)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(Y1;X1, X2, S1, S2)
+I(X2;Y2|X1, S1, S2, Y ′1 ), (31)
Re2 ≤ min
{
I(X2;Y2)− I(X2;Y1), I(X2;Y2|X1)
−I(X2;Y1|X1)
}
, (32)
for all distributions PX1,X2 and PY2,Y ′1 |X1,X2,S1,S2 ,
where Y
′
1 has the same marginal distribution as Y1,
i. e., P
Y
′
1
|X1,X2,S1,S2
= PY1|X1,X2,S1,S2 , is an outer
bound on the capacity of this channel.
Outline of the proof
The rates (29)–(31) are derived using the side information
approach taken by [7]. The rate (32) is derived according to
the previous rate (27) by substituting the auxiliary random
variables V1 and V2 byX1 andX2, respectively. This outer
bound is looser than the one in Theorem 3, but it does not
include auxiliary random variables and thus it can be more
easily evaluated. The details on the proof are relegated to
Appendix C.
3.3. The Gaussian example
To clarify our results more perceptibly, consider the
Gaussian CIC-PCSI. The channel model is shown in
Figure 2, and can be described as follows:
Y1 = X1 + aX2 + S1 + S2 + Z1,
Y2 = bX1 +X2 + S1 + S2 + Z2, (33)
where Xi and Yi denotes the input and the output of
the i-th transmitter-receiver pair.Zi ∼ N (0, 1) is Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) at the i-th receiver
where i ∈ {1, 2}. Si ∼ N (0,Ki) denotes the partial
channel state sequences which are known at the cognitive
transmitter and the corresponding receiver, respectively.
The constants a and b are the real-valued channel gains
in the interfering links and the average power constraint
is 1
n
∑n
k=1(Xi,k(t))
2 ≤ Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}. In this model, for
simplicity, we consider the partial channel state sequences
to be additive and independent Gaussian random variables.
This model can be motivated by the case in which two
different interfering signals affect the channel, and each
one is estimated at one of the cognitive transmitter-receiver
nodes. Now, we consider the cases in which a ≤ 1 and a >
1, separately.
3.3.1. The case a ≤ 1
This case is reported as the weak interference case in
the literature [2, 3]. The capacity region of the CIC in
this case without CSI is determined by [5, 27], in which
the cognitive encoder uses Dirty Paper Coding (DPC)
[19] for W2 against W1. Furthermore, using the SPC in
the cognitive transmitter, the message W1 is conveyed
to receiver 2. In the weak interference case, receiver 2
does not suffer from the interference, since, transmitter 2
uses DPC on X2 against X1 and known channel state.
Moreover, the primary receiver is not affected by the
interfering signal X2 due to the weak interference. The
following theorem describes the achievable equivocation-
rate region of the Gaussian CIC-PCSI in this case.
Theorem 5 (Achievable equivocation-rate region)
The set of rates (R1, R2, Re2) satisfying
R1 ≤ C
( P1
K2 + 1
)
, (34)
R2 ≤ C((1− ρ2)P2), (35)
Re2 ≤ C((1− ρ2)P2)− C((1− ρ2)a2P2), (36)
in which C(x) = 1
2
(1 + x) and ρ ∈ [0, 1], is an achievable
equivocation-rate region of the Gaussian CIC-PCSI, shown
in Figure 2 for the case a ≤ 1.
Proof
The proof is similar to the one presented in [27] without
secrecy and by substituting Xi ∼ N (0, Pi) for i ∈ {1, 2}
and E[X1X2] = ρ
√
P1P2. The channel state S1 is treated
as interference by the cognitive transmitter in DPC and
does not affect the rate. On the other hand, the channel
state S2, which is known non-causally at the cognitive
receiver, can be easily canceled out. Thus, these channel
states do not affect the rate (35). The primary receiver 1
is affected by the channel state S2 as an additional
interference, but the channel state S1 is canceled out for
this receiver by the cognitive transmitter’s cooperation. For
more details on the proof see [27].
Remark 3
The achievable equivocation-rate region for the Gaussian
CIC-PCSI in Theorem 5 is maximized for ρ = 0 since
a ≤ 1. Thus in this case, the cognitive transmitter meets its
capacity and the equivocation leads to C(P2)− C(a2P2).
3.3.2. The case a > 1
In this case, which is known as the strong interfer-
ence [2, 3], the channel output at the cognitive receiver
is a degraded version of that at the primary one, thus
there is no secrecy in this condition, i. e., Re2 = 0. In this
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case, receiver 1, having better observation of X2 than the
cognitive receiver, can decode the message of the cognitive
transmitter without any penalty rate. The capacity of the
CIC without channel state [2, 27], is a trivial outer bound
on the capacity of the CIC-PCSI. This outer bound is
presented in the following.
Theorem 6 (Gaussian outer bound [2, Theorem 2])
The set of rates (R1, R2) satisfying
R2 ≤ C((1− ρ2)P2), (37)
R1 +R2 ≤ C(P1 + a2P2 + 2aρ
√
P1P2), (38)
R1 +R2 ≤ C(b2P1 + P2 + 2bρ
√
P1P2), (39)
is an outer bound on the capacity of the Gaussian CIC-
PCSI for the case a > 1.
4. USING THE SUPERPOSITION
CODING
The cognitive transmitter can superimpose part of its
message on Xn1 instead of binning. Thus, it should split its
message as W2 = W21 +W22, in which W21 is intended
to both receivers and W22 is only decodable at the
cognitive receiver. Moreover, the cognitive transmitter uses
GPC via three auxiliary random variables T , U and V
to reduce the channel state interference for W1, W21
and W22, respectively. In particular, T deals with
state interference for either receiver 1 or receiver 2 to
decode W1; U deals with state interference for either
receiver 1 or receiver 2 to decode W21; and V deals with
state interference for receiver 2 to decode W22. Now, we
propose the main results which are derived based on this
scheme.
4.1. An Inner Bound
Theorem 7 (Achievable equivocation-rate region)
The set of rates (R1, R21, R22, Re2) is achievable if it
satisfies
R1 +R21 ≤ I(T,U,X1;Y1)− I(T,U ;S1|X1), (40)
R22 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2|U,X1, T )− I(V ;S1|U,X1, T ), (41)
R2 ≤ I(U,V ;Y2, S2|X1, T )− I(U,V ;S1|X1, T ), (42)
R2 ≤ I(T,U, V ; Y2, S2|X1)− I(T,U, V ;S1|X1), (43)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T,U, V,X1;Y2, S2)− I(T,U, V ;S1|X1),
(44)
Re2 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2|U,X1, T )
−max{I(V ;S1|U,X1, T ), I(V ;Y1|U,X1, T )}, (45)
for input distribution factors as
PX1S1S2TUVX2Y1Y2 = PS1PS2PX1
×PTUV X2|X1S1PY1Y2|X1X2S1S2 , (46)
in which the r.h.s. of the equations (40)–(45) are non-
negative and T, U, V are auxiliary random variables.
Proof
The proof is relegated to Appendix D.
4.1.1. The Symmetric Channel State
For the special case S1 = S2 = S, we have the
following result.
Corollary 2
For the case in which S1 = S2 = S, the set of
rates (R1, R2, Re2) is achievable if it satisfies
R1 ≤ I(U,X1;Y1)− I(U ;S|X1), (47)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y2|X1, S) (48)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U,X1;Y1) + I(X2;Y2|X1, S)
−I(U ;S|X1), (49)
Re2 ≤ min{I(X2;Y2|U,X1, S),
I(X2;Y2, S|U,X1)− I(X2;Y1|U,X1)}, (50)
for input distribution that factors as
PSX1X2Y1Y2 = PSPX1PX2|X1SPY1Y2|X1X2S. (51)
Proof
The proof follows directly from Theorem 7, by
substituting T = X1, V = X2 and S1 = S2 = S.
4.2. Outer Bound
Now, we provide an outer bound on the capacity of the
CIC-PCSI, as follows.
Theorem 8 (Outer bound 3)
An outer bound on the capacity of the CIC-PCSI consists
of the rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(T,U,X1; Y1)− I(T,U ;S1|X1), (52)
R2 ≤ I(T, V ;Y2, S2|X1)− I(T, V ;S1|X1), (53)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(T, V,X1;Y2, S2)− I(T, V ;S1|X1),(54)
for input distribution that factors as
PX1S1S2TV X2Y1Y2 = PS1PS2PX1PTVX2|X1S1
×PY1Y2|X1X2S1S2 . (55)
Proof
The proof is similar to one taken by [3, Appendix F] by
using the Fano’s inequality.
4.3. The Gaussian Example
In this section, we consider the CIC with partial channel
states (shown in Figure 2) with the channel outputs as (33).
Similar to the cases considered in Section III-C, when a >
1, i. e., Strong Interference, we have no secrecy. Thus, we
consider the other case a ≤ 1. We provide the following
theorem for the Gaussian CIC-PCSI.
Theorem 9 (Achievable equivocation-rate region)
For the Gaussian CIC-PCSI, in the case that a ≤ 1, the
achievable equivocation-rate region consists of the rate
triples (R1, R2, Re2) which satisfy (56)–(59), in the above
of the page, in which P
′′
2 = ρP2 and 0 ≤ ρ, ρ1, ρ2 ≤ 1.
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R1 ≤ C
(P1 + a2P2 +K1 +K2 + 1 + 2aρ1√P1P2 + 2aρ2√P2K1
K1(a2P
′′
2 +K2 + 1)
)
, (56)
R2 ≤ C
(
P
′′
2
)
, (57)
R1 +R2 ≤ C
(
b
2
P1 + P2 +K1 + 2bρ1
√
P1P2 + 2ρ2
√
P2K1
)− 1
2
log
(
K1
)
, (58)
Re2 ≤ C
(
P
′′
2
)− C( a2P ′′2
K2 + 1
)
, (59)
Proof
The proof is based on Theorem 7, by substituting T =
(U,S1) and V = X2 and choosing the following jointly
Gaussian distributions for the random variables:
X1 ∼ N (0, P1), X2 ∼ N (0, P2), (60)
X2 = X
′
2 +X
′′
2 + ρ1
√
P2
P1
X1 + ρ2
√
P2
K1
S1,(61)
X
′
2 ∼ N (0, P
′
2), X
′′
2 ∼ N (0, P
′′
2 ), (62)
P
′
2 + P
′′
2 = (1− ρ21 − ρ22)P2, (63)
U = X
′
2 + αS1, (64)
in which X1, X
′
2, X
′′
2 , and S1, S2 are independent.
Transmitter 2, splits its power into three parts: ρ21P2,
which is used for cooperating with the primary transmitter
sending W1; P
′
2 + ρ
2
2P2, which is used in dirty paper
coding to deal with the state at receiver 1 via an
auxiliary random variable U ; and P
′′
2 which is used for
transmittingW2. The mutual information formulas in (56)-
(59) are calculated by the approach taken by [3].
To compare the results of Theorem 9 with the achievable
equivocation-rate of Theorem 5, we consider a simple case
of Theorem 9 in which the cognitive transmitter uses all its
power to send its individual message. For this case we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 3 (Perfect Secrecy Condition)
For the Gaussian CIC-PCSI, in the case that a ≤ 1,
the achievable secrecy rate region consists the set of
rates (R1, R2) which satisfies
R1 ≤ C
(P1 + a2P2 +K1 +K2 + 1
K1(a2P2 +K2 + 1)
)
, (65)
R2 ≤ C
(
P2
)− C( a2P2
K2 + 1
)
, (66)
R1 +R2 ≤ C
(
b
2
P1 + P2 +K1
)− 1
2
logK1. (67)
Proof
The proof is directly derived from Theorem 9 by
considering the perfect secrecy condition in which R2 ≤
min{R2, Re2}, and by substituting ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 and ρ =
1, X
′
2 = ∅,
Remark 4
Comparing the results of Corollary 3 with the achievable
equivocation-rate region of Theorem 5 shows that the
secrecy rate of (66) is higher than the one of (36), because
ofK2 ≥ 0. It means that the SPC approach achieves higher
secrecy rate than the GPC in general case. Moreover,
comparing (65) with (34) shows that for the case of a ≤
a†, where
a
† =
√
(K2 + 1)(P1 +K1 +K2 + 1)− P1K1(K2 + 1)
P1P2K1 − P2(K2 + 1)
the SPC approach obtains higher achievable rate for the
primary transmitter than the GPC, and for the case of a >
a† vice versa. Thus, in the case of a > a†, there is a trade
off between the secrecy rate of the cognitive transmitter
and the achievable rate of the primary one. Figure 3
shows the secrecy rate of the cognitive transmitter vs. the
achievable rate of the primary one, using the GPC and the
SPC approaches, and it illustrates the trade off between
the R2 and R1 in the case of a > a†.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we studied the Cognitive Interference
Channel in which the partial channel state’s information
is available non-causally at the cognitive transmitter
and corresponding receiver. Furthermore, the cognitive
transmitter wishes to keep its message confidential at
the primary receiver, in addition to have a reliable
communication with its destination. We use the Gel’fand-
Pinsker coding (GPC) and the superposition coding (SPC)
to show that how the cognitive transmitter can use the side
information about the primary message and the channel
state sequence to improve its achievable rate and cooperate
with the primary one. Therefore, we have derived the
achievable equivocation-rate region for this channel in two
cases: by using GPC and SPC. Moreover, in each case the
outer bounds on the capacity and extension to a simple
Gaussian example is presented. In the Gaussian case, we
consider a case in which the partial channel state sequences
are additive and independent Gaussian random variables,
and it is shown that in some cases, there is a trade off
between the secrecy rate of the cognitive transmitter and
the achievable rate of the primary one, using the GPC
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Figure 3: The achievable equivocation-rate region of Theorem 5 (GPC), and the achievable secrecy rate region of
Theorem 9 (SPC) for special values P1 = 4, P2 = 4, K1 = K2 = 1, b = 0.3 and a = 0.1, 0.9. In this case a† = 0.866,
and for a > a†, there is a trade off between the secrecy rate of the cognitive transmitter and the achievable rate of the
primary one.
and GPC approaches. Thus, the cognitive transmitter can
obtain the desired region by choosing the proper coding
scheme.
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof
The proof is established on the proof of [6, Theorem 1]
and [13, Theorem 1]. After introducing the code-book
generation, and the encoding-decoding scheme, the proof
of Theorem 1 is presented in two steps. In step I, we prove
the reliability of the rate region, i. e., the condition under
which the probability of error tends to zero for n→∞.
This step yields to the equations (10)-(15). In step II,
we will calculate the equivocation to evaluate the secrecy
level. This step provides the equation (16).
Code-book generation:
1. For split rates (8)-(9), generate 2nR1a
codewords xn1a(w1a), w1a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1a},
choosing xn1a,n(w1a) independently according
to PX1a(·).
2. For each w1a, generate 2nR1b code-
words xn1b(w1a, w1b) using Πni=1PX1b|X1a(· |
x1a,i(w1a)), where w1b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1b}.
3. Over each pair (w1a, w1b) we gener-
ate xn1 (w1a, w1b) where x1 is a deterministic
function of (x1a, x1b).
4. Generate 2n(R2b+R
′
2b
) codewords un(w2b, b2b),
w2b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2b}, b2b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR
′
2b}
using PU (·).
5. For each un(w2b, b2b) generate 2n(R2a+R
′
2a
)
codewords vn(w2b, b2b, w2a, b2a), w2a ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2nR2a}, b2a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR
′
2a}
using Πnn=1PV |U (· | un(w2b, b2b)).
6. Now, define L1 = I(V ;Y2, S2|U)−
I(V ;Y1, X1|U), L2 = I(V ;Y1, X1|U). Note
that, here we assume that R2a > L1 ≥ 0, for the
case R2a < L1 the similar coding scheme can
be used to obtain the perfect secrecy, which is
mentioned at the end of the proof. Let
W2a = A× B (68)
where A = {1, 2, . . . , 2n(R2a−L1)} and B =
{1, 2, . . . , 2nL1}. Then, we define the
mapping f : B → C to partition B into 2nL1
subsets with nearly equal size which means
‖f−1(c1)‖ ≤ 2‖f−1(c2)‖ for each c1, c2 ∈ C.
(69)
Now we define the mapping w2a = (a, c)→
(a, b), in which b is chosen randomly from the
set f−1(c) ⊂ B.
7. Over each pairw1 andw2(w2a(a, c), w2b), we gen-
erate xn1 and xn2 (w1, w2b, w2a(a, c), b2b, b2a, s1)
where x2 is a deterministic function
of (u, v, x1, s1).
Encoding:
1. Encoder 2 splits the nR2 bitsw2 intonR2a bitsw2a
and nR2b bits w2b. Similarly, it splits the nR1
bits w1 into nR1a bits w1a and nR1b bits w1b.
Thus,
w2 = (w2a, w2b), w1 = (w1a, w1b). (70)
2. Encoder 2, finds a bin index b2b such
that (un(w2b, b2b), xn1a(w1a), xn1b(w1a, w1b), sn1 )
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are jointly typical. If such a b2b is not found, it
chooses b2b = 1.
3. For each (w2b, b2b) and given sn1 encoder 2 finds
a bin index b2a such that (vn(w2b, b2b, w2a, b2a),
un(w2b, b2b), x
n
1a(w1a), x
n
1b(w1a, w1b), s
n
1 ) are
jointly typical.
4. Transmitter 1 transmits xn1 (w1a, w1b).
5. Transmitter 2 transmits
xn2 (w1a, w1b, w2a, b2a, w2b, b2b, s
n
1 ).
Decoding:
1. For given yn1 , decoder 1
chooses (wˆ1a, wˆ1b, wˆ2b, bˆ2b) such that(
un(wˆ2b, bˆ2b), x
n
1a(wˆ1a), x
n
1b(wˆ1a, wˆ1b), y
n
1
)
are jointly typical. If there is no such quadruple it
chooses (1, 1, 1, 1).
2. For given yn2 , sn2 decoder 2
chooses (wˆ2b, bˆ2b, wˆ2a, bˆ2a) such that(
vn(wˆ2b, bˆ2b, wˆ2a, bˆ2a), u
n(wˆ2b, bˆ2b), y
n
2 , s
n
2
)
are jointly typical. If there are more than one such
quadruple, it chooses one of them. If there is not
any quadruple, it chooses (1, 1, 1, 1).
A.1. Step I: (Reliability) achievability of the rate
region (10)–(15)
Reliability of the rate region (10)–(15) will be proved here
by analyzing the error probability.
Error analysis: Using this scheme for coding and
decoding, analysis of the error is derived following [6].
First, we suppose that (w2a, w2b, w1a, w1b) = (1, 1, 1, 1)
is sent. An encoder error occurs in one of the following
situations.
1- E1: Encoder 2, cannot find a bin index b2b
such that (un(1, b2b), xn1a(1), xn1b(1, 1), sn1 ) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ (PU,X1a,X1b,S1) in which T
(n)
ǫ (PXY ) denotes
the jointly ǫ-typical set with respect to PXY . It can be
shown, by covering lemma [16], that for n→∞ such b2b
exists with high probability if we have
R
′
2b > I(U ;X1a, X1b, S1) + δ, (71)
in which δ tends to zero as n→∞ [6].
2- E2: After finding b2b = 1,
encoder 2 cannot find b2a such that
(vn(1, 1, 1, b2a), u
n(1, 1), xn1a(1), x
n
1b(1, 1), s
n
1 ) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ (PU,V,X1a,X1b,S1). It can be shown [6] that
for n→∞, such b2a exists with high probability if we
have
R
′
2a > I(V ;X1a, X1b, S1|U) + δ. (72)
Now, we should compute the probabilities of the error
events at the decoder, which are shown in TABLE I.
The second column of the table shows the corresponding
bounds of the rates, which can be shown, make the error
probability of each event tend to zero, as n→∞. For
more details about the derivation of the bounds proposed
in TABLE I see [6]. Using these bounds, the achievability
of (10)–(15) are proved.
A.2. Step II: (Security) achievability of the
equivocation-rate region (16)
In this step, the achievability of the equivocation-rate
region (16) will be driven. To this purpose, we compute
the equivocation.
Equivocation-rate calculation: To prove (16), for the
equivocation-rate Re2 , we follow the proof reported in [2,
13,28]. We establish computing of the equivocation for the
cognitive transmitter as follows.
H(W2a,W2b | Y n1 )
≥ H(W2a,W2b | Y n1 ,W1,W2b)
= H(W2a, Y
n
1 |W1,W2b)−H(Y n1 |W1,W2b)
= H(W2a, Y
n
1 , V
n |W1,W2b)
−H(V n |W2a,W1,W2b, Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |W1,W2b)
= H(W2a, V
n |W1,W2b)
+H(Y n1 |W1,W2b,W2a, V n)
−H(V n |W2a,W1,W2b, Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |W1,W1b)
(a)
≥ H(V n |W1,W2b) +H(Y n1 | V n, Un, Xn1 )
−H(V n |W2a,W1,W2b, Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |W1,W2b)
(73)
where (a) is because of the fact that given V n, W2a
is uniquely determined and Y n1 is independent
of (W1,W2b,W2a) given (V n, Un, Xn1 ). Now, we
bound each term in r.h.s. of (73). For the first term in (73),
we have
H(V n |W1,W2b)
(b)
≥ H(V n | Un, Xn1 )
≥ H(V n | Un, Xn1 )−H(V n | Un, Y n2 , Sn2 )
= I(V n; Y n2 , S
n
2 | Un)− I(V n;Xn1 | Un)
(c)
≥ n[I(V ;Y2, S2 | U)− I(V ;X1 | U)] (74)
where (b) is derived by using the data processing
inequality [29], which implies that V n is independent
of (W1,W2b) given (Un, Xn1 ), and (c) is derived using
the approach taken in [30, Lemma 3]. For the second term
in the r.h.s of (73) we follow the related equations in [2]
and obtain
1
n
H(Y n1 | V n, Un, Xn1 ) ≥ H(Y1 | V,U,X1, S1)− ǫ1,
(75)
where ǫ1 is negligible for n→∞. To compute the third
term in the r.h.s of (73), similar to [2, Lemma 2], by using
Fano’s inequality we obtain
1
n
H(V n |W2a,W1,W2b, Y n1 ) < ǫ2 (76)
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Table I: Error events in joint decoding and corresponding rate bounds
Error event Arbitrarily small positive error probability if
E1 (wˆ2b 6= 1, wˆ2a = 1) R2b +R′2b ≤ I(U, V ; Y2, S2)
E2 (wˆ2b = 1, wˆ2a 6= 1) R2a +R′2a ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2|U)
E3 (wˆ2b 6= 1, wˆ2a 6= 1) R2b +R′2b +R2a +R
′
2a ≤ I(U,V ;Y2, S2)
E
′
1 (wˆ1a 6= 1, wˆ1b = 1, wˆ
′
2b = 1) R1a ≤ I(X1a, X1b;U, Y1)
E
′
2 (wˆ1a 6= 1, wˆ1b 6= 1, wˆ
′
2b = 1) R1a +R1b ≤ I(X1a, X1b;U, Y1)
E
′
3 (wˆ1a 6= 1, wˆ1b = 1, wˆ
′
2b 6= 1) R1a +R1b +R
′
1b ≤ I(U,X1a, X1b;Y1) + I(U ;X1a, X1b)
E
′
4 (wˆ1a 6= 1, wˆ1b 6= 1, wˆ
′
2b 6= 1) R1a +R1b +R2b +R
′
2b ≤ I(U,X1a, X1b;Y1) + I(U ;X1a, X1b)
E
′
5 (wˆ1a = 1, wˆ1b 6= 1, wˆ
′
2b = 1) R1b ≤ I(X1b;Y1, U |X1a)
E
′
6 (wˆ1a = 1, wˆ1b 6= 1, wˆ
′
2b 6= 1) R1b +R2b +R
′
2b ≤ I(X1b, U ;Y1|X1a) + I(U ;X1a, X1b)
where ǫ2 is negligible, when n→∞. To compute the
fourth term in (73), first we define
yˆ
n
1 =


yn1 if
(
un(w2b, b2b), x
n
1a(w1a),
xn1b(w1a, w1b), y
n
1
)
∈ T (n)ǫ (PUX1Y1)
zn Otherwise
(77)
where zn is an arbitrary sequence that is contained in Yn1 .
Now, we have
1
n
H(Y n1 |W1,W2b)
=
1
n
∑
w1,w2b
[Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
H(Y n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b)]
≤ 1
n
∑
w1,w2b
[Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
H(Yˆ n1 , Y
n
1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b)]
=
1
n
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
[
H(Yˆ n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b)
+H(Y n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b, Yˆ n1 )
]
(78)
For the first term in (78) we can write
1
n
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
H(Yˆ n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b)
(d)
≤ 1
n
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
× log |T (n)ǫ (PY1|U,X1)|
≤
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
×[H(Y1 | U,X1) + ǫ3]
≤ H(Y1 | U,X1) + ǫ3, (79)
where (d) is based on AEP [29], and ǫ3 is negligible
for n→∞. To bound the second term in the r.h.s of (78),
we use Fano’s inequality and obtain
1
n
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
H(Y n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b, Yˆ n1 )
≤ 1
n
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
(
1 + Pr{Y n1 6= Yˆ n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
× log |Y1|n
)
=
1
n
+ log |Y1|
∑
w1,w2b
Pr{W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
Pr{Y n1 6= Yˆ n1 |W1 = w1,W2b = w2b}
≤ ǫ4, (80)
where ǫ4 is negligible for n→∞. Hence, from (79)
and (80), the forth term of the r.h.s. of (73) is bounded as
1
n
H(Y n1 |W1,W2b) ≤ H(Y1 | U,X1) + ǫ5, (81)
in which ǫ5 tends to zero for n→∞. Substitut-
ing (74), (75), (76) and (81) into (73), we obtain
1
n
H (W2a,W2b | Y n1 )
≥ I(V ;Y2, S2, U)− I(V ;X1, U)
+H(Y1 | V,U,X1, S1)−H(Y1 | U,X1)− ǫ6
≥ I(V ;Y2, S2, U)− I(V,S1;X1, U)
−I(Y1;V, S1|U,X1)− ǫ6
= I(V ;Y2, S2, U)− I(V,S1;X1, Y1, U)− ǫ6
(82)
where ǫ6 is negligible for n→∞. Regard to the definition
of Re2 in (5)-(6) we conclude
Re2 ≤ I(V ;Y2, S2, U)− I(V,S1;X1, Y1, U). (83)
and therefore (16) is proved.
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B. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof of Theorem 3
For a quadruple code (M1,M2, n, Pe) for the CIC-PCSI,
we consider the outer bound onR1 proposed in (24). Using
the Fano’s inequality we have
nR1 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Y n1,i+1)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
i−1
2 , Y
n
1,i+1;Y1,i)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Ui;Y1,i), (84)
where (e) is derived by substituting Ui = (Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1).
Then, by substituting V1,i = W1, the outer bound on R1 is
derived. Similarly, we have
nR1 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 )
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y
i−1
2 , Y
n
1,i+1, Y1,i)
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i, Ui), (85)
where (f) is derived by substituting Ui = (Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1).
Thus, the outer bound on R1 is proved. The outer bound
for R2 is derived as follows:
nR2 ≤ I(W2;Y n2 |Sn1 , Sn2 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Y
n
1,i+1;Y2,i|Y i−12 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
−I(Y n1,i+1;Y i2 |Y i−12 , Sn1 , Sn2 ,W2)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y2,i|Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
+I(Y n1,i+1;Y2,i|Y i−12 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
−I(Y n1,i+1;Y2,i|Y i−12 , Sn1 , Sn2 ,W2)
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y2,i|Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
+I(Y i−12 ;Y1,i,W2|Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
−I(W2; Y i−12 |Y n1,i+1, Y1,i, Sn1 , Sn2 )
−I(Y i−12 ;Y1,i|Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 ,W2)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y
i
2 |Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
−I(W2;Y i−12 |Y n1,i, Sn1 , Sn2 )
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y
i
2 |Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Ui;Y2,i|Sn1 , Sn2 ), (86)
where (g) is derived by Csisza´r sum identity [16]. Then,
by substituting V1,i = W1 and V2,i = W2, the outer bound
on R2 is derived. From Fano’s inequality [29, Chapter 7]
we have
n(R1 +R2)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 ) + I(W2;Y n2 |Sn1 , Sn2 )
(h)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 ) + I(W2;Y n2 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i|Y n1,i+1)
+I(W2;Y
i
2 |W1, Y n1,i+1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
−
[
I(W2, Y1,i;Y
i−1
2 |W1, Y n1,i)
−I(Y1,i;Y i−12 |W1, Y n1,i)
]
(i)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
i−1
2 ; Y1,i|Y n1,i+1)
+I(W2;Y2,i|W1, Sn1 , Sn2 , Ui)
−I(Y1,i;Y i−12 |W2,W1, Y n1,i+1)
≤ I(W1, Ui;Y1,i)
+I(W2;Y2,i|W1, Sn1 , Sn2 , Ui), (87)
where (h) is since that W2 is independent of W1 and (i)
is derived by substituting Ui = (Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1). Similarly,
we have
n(R1 +R2)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 |W2) + I(W2;Y n2 |Sn1 , Sn2 )
(j)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i|Ui,W2) + I(W2, Ui;Y2,i|Sn1 , Sn2 ),
(88)
and (j) is derived by using the same approach as (87).
Finally, for the equivocation-rate regionRe2 , we derive the
outer bound, using the approach taken in [13], as follows:
nRe2 ≤ H(W2|Y n1 )
= H(W2)− I(W2;Y n1 )
= I(W2; Y
n
2 )− I(W2;Y n1 ) +H(W2|Y n2 )
(k)
≤ I(W2; Y n2 )− I(W2;Y n1 ) + 2nǫn, (89)
where (k) is derived from the Channel Coding Theo-
rem [29, Chapter 7] which implies that in a reliable com-
munication, the entropy of W2 given Y n2 is less than ǫn
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which is negligible as n→∞. Then, we have
I(W2; Y
n
1 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y1,i | Y n1,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y1,i | Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1)
+I(Y i−12 ;Y1,i | Y n1,i+1)
−I(Y i−12 ;Y1,i | Y n1,i+1,W2). (90)
Therefore, for (89) we have
nRe2 ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W2, Y
n
1,i+1;Y2,i | Y i−12 )
−I(Y n1,i+1; Y2,i | Y i−12 ,W2)
]
−
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y1,i | Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1)
−I(Y i−12 ; Y1,i | Y n1,i+1)
+I(Y i−12 ; Y1,i | Y n1,i+1,W2)
(l)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i | Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1)
−I(W2;Y1,i | Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1), (91)
where (l) is derived from the Csisza´r sum identity [16]
which implies that
∑n
i=1 I(Y
i−1
2 ;Y1,i | Y n1,i+1,W2) =∑n
i=1 I(Y
n
1,i+1;Y2,i | Y n2,i−1,W2), and the non-
negativity of the mutual information function. Similarly, it
can be shown that
nRe2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i | Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1,W1)
−I(W2;Y1,i | Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1,W1). (92)
Now, by substituting Ui = (Y i−12 , Y n1,i+1), V1,i =
W1, V2,i = W2, the proof is completed.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof of Theorem 4
For R1, using Fano’s inequality we have
nR1 ≤ I(W1; Y n1 )
≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1 )
≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |W1,W2)
≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |W1,W2, Xn1 , Xn2 )
(m)
≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |Xn1 , Xn2 )
≤ I(Xn1 , Xn2 ;Y n1 ), (93)
where (m) is due to the fact that Y n1 is independent
of (W1,W2) given (Xn1 , Xn2 ). Now, from Fano’s
inequality we have
nR2 ≤ I(W2;Y n2 |Sn1 , Sn2 )
≤ I(W2;Y n2 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
≤ I(W2, Xn2 ;Y n2 |W1, Xn1 (W1), Sn1 , Sn2 )
= H(Y n2 |W1, Xn1 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
−H(Y n2 |W1,W2, Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
(n)
≤ H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
−H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
= I(Xn2 ;Y
n
2 |Xn1 , Sn1 , Sn2 ), (94)
where (n) is because of the fact that conditioning does
not increase the entropy function and Y n2 is independent
of (W1,W2) given (Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn1 , Sn2 ). Now, for R1 +
R2, from Fano’s inequality we have
n(R1 +R2)
≤ I(W2;Y n2 |Sn1 , Sn2 ) + I(W1;Y n1 )
≤ I(W2;Y n2 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 ) + I(W1;Y n1 )
≤ I(W2;Y n2 , Y
′n
1 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 ) + I(W1;Y n1 )
≤ I(W2;Y
′n
1 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 )
+I(W2;Y
n
2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1, S
n
1 , S
n
2 ) + I(W1;Y
n
1 )
= H(Y
′n
1 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 )−H(Y
′n
1 |W1,W2, Sn1 , Sn2 )
+H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1, S
n
1 , S
n
2 )
−H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1,W2, S
n
1 , S
n
2 ) +H(Y
n
1 )
−H(Y n1 |W1)
(o)
≤ −H(Y ′n1 |W1,W2, Sn1 , Sn2 )
+H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1, S
n
1 , S
n
2 )
−H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1,W2, S
n
1 , S
n
2 ) +H(Y
n
1 )
(p)
≤ −H(Y ′n1 |W1,W2, X1, X2, Sn1 , Sn2 )
+H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1, X1, S
n
1 , S
n
2 )
−H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 ,W1,W2, X1, X2, S
n
1 , S
n
2 ) +H(Y
n
1 )
≤ −H(Y ′n1 |Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
+H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 , X
n
1 , S
n
1 , S
n
2 )
−H(Y n2 |Y
′n
1 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 , S
n
1 , S
n
2 ) +H(Y
n
1 )
≤ I(Y n1 ;Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn1 , Sn2 )
+I(Y n2 ;X
n
2 |Y
′n
1 , X
n
1 , S
n
1 , S
n
2 ), (95)
where (o) is because that H(Y
′n
1 |W1, Sn1 , Sn2 )−
H(Y n1 |W1) ≤ 0, and (p) is due to the fact the
conditioning does not increase the entropy. Thus, the
proof is completed.
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D. PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Proof of Theorem 7
To derive the equivocation-rate region (40)–(45), first
we should propose the code-book generation and the
encoding-decoding schemes.
Code-book generation:
1. Generate 2nR1 codewords xn1 (w1), w1 ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2nR1}, choosing xn1 (w1) independently
according to PX1(.).
2. For each xn1 (w1), generate 2nR˜1 code-
words tn(w1, v1) using
∏n
i=1 PT |X1(.|xn1 (w1)),
where v1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . 2nR˜1}.
3. For each xn1 (w1) and tn(w1, v1),
generate un(w1, v1, w21, v21) with i.i.d
components based on PU|X1T , in which w21 ∈
{1, 2, . . . 2nR21} and v21 ∈ {1, 2, . . . 2nR˜21}.
4. For each xn1 (w1), tn(w1, v1)
and un(w1, v1, w21, v21) gener-
ate vn(w1, v1, w21, v21, w22, v22) with i.i.d
components based on PV |X1TU , in which w22 ∈
{1, 2, . . . 2nR22} and v22 ∈ {1, 2, . . . 2nR˜22}.
5. Now, distribute vn sequences randomly
to 2nR bin such that each bin contains 2nM
sequences, where R = R22 −M and M =
max{I(V ;S1|U,X1, T ), I(V ;Y1|U,X1, T )}.
Then, index each bin by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR}.
Next, partition 2nM sequences in every bin
into 2n[M−I(V ;Y1|U,X1,T )] subbin each subbin
contains 2nI(V ;Y1|U,X1,T ) sequences. Index each
subbin by a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2n[M−I(V ;Y1|U,X1,T )]}
and let A be the random variable to represent
the index of the subbin, and let B be the random
variable to represent the index of the sequences in
each subbin.
Encoding: Define A = 1, 2, . . . , A and B =
1, 2, . . . , B where A and B are defined before.
Let W22 = A× C where C = {1, 2, . . . , B}.
Now, define the mapping g : B → C to map B
into C subsets with nearly equal size. Encoder 1
for given w1, transmits xn1 (w1). Encoder 2 for
given w1, xn1 (w1) and sn1 , chooses tn(w1, v1) such
that (tn(w1, v1), xn1 (w1), sn1 ) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PT,X1,S1). For
given w21 and tn(w1, v1) it chooses un(w1, v1, w21, v21)
such that (un, tn, xn1 , sn1 ) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PU,T,X1,S1). Next, for
given w22, it uses the mapping w22 = (a, c)→ (a, b)
which b is chosen randomly from the set g−1(c) ⊂ B.
Then, it chooses vn(w1, v1, w21, v21, w22(a, b), v22) such
that (vn, un, tn, xn1 , sn1 ) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PV,U,T,X1,S1). Finally,
it transmits xn2 (vn, un, tn, xn1 , sn1 ).
Decoding: Decoder 1, given yn1 ,
finds (wˆ1, vˆ1, wˆ21, vˆ21) such that
(un(wˆ1, vˆ1, wˆ21, vˆ21), t
n(wˆ1, vˆ1), x
n
1 (wˆ1), s
n
2 ) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ (PU,T,X1,S2). Decoder 2, given yn2 and sn2 ,
finds (wˆ1, vˆ1, wˆ21, vˆ21, wˆ22(a, b), vˆ22) such that
(vn(wˆ1, vˆ1, wˆ21, vˆ21, wˆ22(a, b), vˆ22), u
n(wˆ1, vˆ1, wˆ21, vˆ21),
tn(wˆ1, vˆ1), x
n
1 (wˆ1), s
n
2 ) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PV,U,T,X1,S2).
Error analysis: First, fix the channel joint distribution
as (55). The error analysis is similar to the one presented
in [3]. Thus, the equations (40)–(44) are derived by
combining these results.
Equivocation-rate calculation: The equivocation of
the W2 at receiver 1 is calculated as follows:
H(W2|Y n1 )
= H(W2, Y
n
1 )−H(Y n1 )
= H(W2, Y
n
1 , A,W1)−H(Y n1 )−H(A,W1|W2, Y n1 )
= H(W2, A,W1, Y
n
1 , V
n)−H(V n|W2, A,W1, Y n1 )
−H(Y n1 )−H(A,W1|W2, Y n1 )
= H(W2, A,W1|Y n1 , V n) +H(Y n1 , V n)−H(Y n1 )
−H(V n|W2, A,W1, Y n1 )−H(A,W1|W2, Y n1 )
(q)
≥ H(V n|Y n1 )−H(V n|W2, A,W1, Y n1 )
−H(A,W1|W2, Y n1 )
(r)
≥ H(V n|Y n1 , Un, Xn1 , Tn)−H(V n|W2, A,W1, Y n1 )
− log |A| −H(V n|Y n2 , Sn2 , Un, Xn1 , Tn)
(s)
≥ n
[
I(V ;Y2, S2|U,X1, T )− I(V ;Y1|U,X1, T )
]
−H(V n|W2, A,W1, Y n1 )
−
[
max{I(V ;S1|U,X1, T ), I(V ;Y1|U,X1, T )}
−I(V ;Y1|U,X1, T )
]
≥ n
[
I(V ;Y2, S2|U,X1, T )
−max{I(V ;S1|U,X1, T ), I(V ;Y1|U,X1, T )}
]
,(96)
where (q) follows from the non-negativity of entropy
function; (r) follows from the fact that conditioning does
not increase the entropy, the non-negativity of entropy
function, and the fact that H(A,W1|W2, Y n1 ) =
H(A|W2, Y n1 ) +H(W1|A,W2, Y n1 ) ≤ H(A) ≤
log |A|, thanks to H(W1|A,W2, Y n1 ) = 0; (s) is
because of Fano’s inequality which implies that the
term H(V n|W2, A,W1, Y n1 ) tends to zero for n→∞
(see [20]). The proof is completed.
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